Regeneration and poverty in Scotland: Evidence and policy review by Robertson, Douglas
  
 
  
Regeneration and poverty in Scotland: 
Evidence and policy review 
 
 
 
Author: 
Douglas Robertson 
School of Applied Social Science, University of Stirling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
July 2014 
 
  
  
Contents 
 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
2. Reviewing the evidence ........................................................................................................ 2 
3. Summary .............................................................................................................................. 21 
4. References ........................................................................................................................... 26 
 
 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 1 
 1 1. Introduction 
This report reviews the evidence on the impact of regeneration on poverty in 
Scotland. It is part of a wider research project for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
that looks at the impact of regeneration on poverty across the UK. A main report - 
Regeneration and poverty: evidence and policy review (Crisp et al., 2014) - 
comprehensively summarises all the evidence across the UK. This report on 
Northern Ireland is one of three smaller reviews produced, respectively, for Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland to ensure full discussion of the distinct approaches 
taken across the UK with regard to regeneration as a devolved policy area1. Details 
of the methods used to review the available evidence are provided in the main report. 
There is a tendency when undertaking policy reviews to package up policy into 
distinct, almost hermetically sealed, temporal periods, split by different political 
administrations: in this case pre-Thatcher / Thatcher-Major / New Labour. However 
there are drawbacks to adopting such an approach. Policy rarely aligns neatly with 
administration dates. While some contentious policies may get reformed almost 
immediately with the advent of the new political regime, most typically flow over and 
continue to be pursued for some time before becoming subject to reform. Within 
Scotland this delay is further exaggerated given the fact that there has long been a 
different policy-making and legislative structure, to accommodate both the country's 
distinct territorial politics and the specific legal requirements of Scots Law, thus 
resulting in distinct, and on occasions differing policies. That said, given for the most 
part Britain is a unified state, Scottish policy tended to mirror UK policy objectives, if 
not in the exact detail, then at least in broad conception. Scottish devolution, enacted 
in 1999, further acknowledges and reinforces such policy difference or divergence, 
now more so with a Scottish Nationalist government in Scotland and the 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition in the UK, than when New Labour 
controlled both administrations. So currently, the health service, higher education, 
schools, housing and regeneration policy now appear markedly different when 
compared to England. To a degree Scotland holds onto social democratic policy 
objectives that have been progressively abandoned within England, rather than the 
rolling out of a distinctive and new agenda. Refining the operational nuances of that 
pre-existing policy agenda tends to characterise the current situation in Scotland. 
So in dispensing with this classification convention, a single continuous narrative is 
offered which explores the interrelationship, or rather the tangential relationship, 
between regeneration and poverty in Scotland, in order to reveal not so much the 
policy differences, but rather the continuities that are highly evident within Scottish 
regeneration policy since the 1960s. That is not to deny change has occurred, for it 
clearly has, but by adopting this longer continuous timeframe it is also possible to 
reveal the long-standing continuities, often described as ‘path dependent’ trajectories, 
as well as the re-emergence of previous approaches, often offered in the guise of 
something new. 
                                               
1
 
1
 The main report and three smaller country reviews are all available at http://www.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/ 
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This national review first examines the long tradition within Scotland of pursuing 
overt physically focused regeneration initiatives while, at the same time, having the 
social and economic elements kept quite separate and distinct. Through attempting 
to create ‘joined-up thinking’, by encouraging the synergies of partnership working, 
different bodies were from the 1990s encouraged by government to come together to 
promote regeneration. In common with past practice, it initially adopted an area-
based focus, with physical solutions still dominating. However, just in the last decade, 
both the domination of physical solutions and its area focus have all but disappeared, 
to be replaced by policy outcomes conceived nationally, but delivered locally, which 
prioritise the social and economic, and are delivered via mainstream local 
government funding and not dedicated resources earmarked by central government. 
So while the term regeneration still has a policy resonance, it is now harder to define 
what exactly that policy constitutes. In tracing this long slow policy transformation it is 
also interesting to consider just how core policy thinking towards regeneration has 
become to local authority strategic planning, as illustrated by community planning 
and now Single Outcome Agreements (SOAs) between local authorities and the 
Scottish Government. It is also important to see the synergies that exist with English 
policy, for although the terminology and approach may appear to differ, outcomes 
often closely align, although this could equally be said for European regeneration 
policy as a whole. 
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2 2. Reviewing the evidence 
Physical focus 
Adopting a slightly longer timeframe, for over eighty years central government in 
Scotland has chosen to intervene, in a variety of ways, to initiate regeneration as a 
means to tackle poor living conditions, and by implication poverty. As will be shown 
the differing theories about poverty, its causes and consequences, although often 
assumed within the stated policy objectives of regeneration, rarely found expression 
in the implied rationales for specific policy approaches. So addressing poverty per se 
has always been implied, but rarely features as an explicit ambition of regeneration 
policy. While in the past such interventions were administered through local 
government, with approval being controlled by government, from the 1970s there 
was a growing preference by government to utilise their own dedicated agencies and 
specified budgets. Localised and persistent poor housing conditions were now 
considered beyond the competence of local government. In the last decade, however, 
perhaps as a consequence of devolution local authorities have again come to the 
fore as the prime agents for regeneration, albeit now without additional dedicated 
central government funding. 
Regeneration has also been distinct in having a long-standing policy commitment to 
area, or neighbourhood based initiatives, primarily delivering physical housing 
solutions. But again in the last decade this focus has gone. Previously, the approach 
could be characterised as ‘environmental determinism’, in that there was an 
underlying assumption that better physical environments act to ‘improve’ the people 
who reside within them, an approach dating back to the original slum clearance 
programmes undertaken in the mid-1930s in order to address both overcrowding and 
its association with ill health, especially tuberculosis. In fact ‘environmental 
determinism’ has strong roots in both planning and housing, being pioneered by 
Patrick Geddes and his use of ‘conservative surgery’ to regenerate Edinburgh’s Old 
Town at the turn of the 19th century (Robertson, 2012). Interestingly Geddes also tied 
social improvement into physical and environmental improvements through involving 
children’s play groups and community participation in these works (Haworth, 2000). 
This long-standing physical focus of regeneration had powerful backing from 
professional property interests: architects, quantity surveyors, civil engineers, 
builders, planners and housing professionals. These interests were also well 
represented with the major central government funded bureaucracies whose raison 
d’être was primarily to pursue housing regeneration: in sequential order, the Scottish 
Special Housing Association (SSHA), established in 1937, then the Housing 
Corporation in Scotland, from 1964, before Scottish Homes in 1989 and, latterly, 
Communities Scotland from 2001. With its abolition in 2008 there is no longer a 
dedicated central housing agency focused on this work, and this has had 
implications for both the scale and future locus of regeneration work. Both Edinburgh 
and Glasgow administer housing capital budgets provided by the Scottish 
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Government, while all other authorities make bids for resources to government. 
Area-based housing regeneration, in large part, appears to have had its day. 
Distinctive aspects of physical regeneration work, particularly land reclamation and 
improvement, were also pursued by the Scottish Development Agency (SDA), 
established in 1975, and Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB), created 
earlier in 1965. Both these Scottish Office economic development bodies were re-
branded in 1991: the SDA became Scottish Enterprise (SE) and the HIDB, Highlands 
and Islands Enterprise (HIE). From that time until 2008 both bodies also operated a 
semi-independent network of Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) which sought to 
deliver local economic development within a defined geographic locality. 
Employment training and skills development also featured, albeit minimally, given SE 
emerged in 1991 from an amalgamation of the Manpower Services Commission / 
Scottish Training Agency and SDA, and Careers Scotland and SE in 2002. However, 
as of 2008 careers and training work was undertaken by Skills Development 
Scotland. Both the environmental works and skills training were rarely tied into 
housing regeneration initiatives, unless they were defined partners in a specific 
project or initiative, so, in large part, economic development ran largely 
independently of deprived localities, nowhere more so than in Glasgow (Robertson, 
1998; Webster, 2000). 
Community renewal 
Paralleling the dominant physical housing approach there is also a long and often 
forgotten history of the Scottish Office ‘top slicing’ local government budgets to 
provide a separate pot of money from which social, or more accurately, distinct 
community dimensions of poverty and deprivation could be addressed. Politically and 
administratively this also allowed central government some insight and scope to offer 
direct assistance to places of poverty. The focus was on short-life projects which 
were, in the main, supported by a combination of community workers and local 
authority departments keen to extend their traditional reach and budgets (Taylor, 
1988). The Urban Programme, introduced in 1968 throughout Britain, also known as 
Urban Aid, existed in Scotland until its funds were merged into the new Partnership 
Programme in 1995 (Taylor, 2002). In 1992/3 in Scotland a total of 1,534 projects 
were funded, to a tune of £80m (Taylor, 2002). Local government, which was 
required to contribute 25 per cent of any approved project costs, thus made up some 
£20m of contribution. Given the Scottish Homes budget at that time amounted to 
between £300 and £400m, with another £60m spent on its own housing stock, and 
the Scottish Enterprise budget was £350m, both of which embraced capital and 
revenue, this scale of funding was never as substantial (see Scottish Homes and 
Scottish Enterprise annual reports, 1992/3 to 1995/6). 
Grants for Urban Aid had always been subject to a competitive bidding process, 
adjudicated by the Scottish Office. Eligible local authorities were those containing the 
‘worst 10 per cent’ of Scotland’s Census enumeration districts (EDs), using a 
composite measure of social and economic disadvantage (Taylor, 1988). Either the 
local authority itself, or voluntary bodies supported by the local authority, could bid 
for and deliver an agreed project. Initially the emphasis was on ‘positive 
discrimination’ as determined by local authorities. Over time there was a subtle 
change to meeting local needs, something encouraged during the Conservative 
period by the Scottish Office which was keen to support projects managed by local 
community groups or voluntary organisations. In 1982/3 67 per cent of the 
programme was run by local authorities themselves, but by 1993/4 around 60 per 
cent were projects managed in this way (Scottish Office, 1993). Only half of the 600 
annual bids that year secured funding (Scottish Office, 1993). 
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Urban Aid originated out of an UK interest in the US Federal Government’s ‘War on 
Poverty’ programme, initiated by the Democratic administration. This programme 
also generated an interest in educational disadvantage, best encapsulated by the 
famous Plowden Report which advocated ‘positive discrimination’ via skewing 
educational resources to poorer neighbourhoods through the declaration of 
Educational Priority Areas (HMSO, 1967). The publication of the National Children’s 
Bureau study ’Born to fail?’ (Wedge and Prosser, 1973), given its widespread media 
coverage, reinforced the policy commitment to area-based ‘positive discrimination’ 
(Young, 1999). 
An early example of this was the Ferguslie Park Community Development 
Programme (CDP), one of 12 established across the UK from 1968 onwards. 
Ferguslie was a classic ‘slum clearance’ tenemental council housing estate, build in 
1930s (CDP, 1978a; Damer, 1974). Built to house the most ‘incorrigible’ tenants of 
Paisley Corporation, it had long been used as an allocations ‘dumping ground’, for 
those marginalised and in severe housing need, but effectively denied access to 
other council stock (Paisley CDP, 1978b; Clark, 1988; Mathews, 2012b). Through 
access to community workers the local community was to be supported to improve 
local housing conditions by campaigning for local authority investment. A similar 
campaign of action in the early 1970s, again drawing on Urban Aid monies, occurred 
in Possilpark, Glasgow, following the then Conservative Prime Minister Edward 
Heath visit, given his personal shock at local housing conditions. 
Perhaps Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC) evidences the most comprehensive 
illustration of how this approach was used in Scotland, via their now largely forgotten 
anti-poverty strategy ‘Social Strategy for the 1980s’ (SRC, 1983). The Regional 
Council, established in 1975 in the wake of the ‘positive discrimination’ agenda, 
sought to tackle multiple deprivation through adopting an explicit area-based focus, 
through declaring geographically defined Areas of Priority Treatment (APTs), in order 
that community-based interventions could be prioritised and implemented via Urban 
Aid monies. In total 45 such areas were designated, in the main within large 
peripheral council housing estates with a 10,000 plus population experiencing ‘official’ 
unemployment rates of over 20 per cent (Young, 1999). The vast majority of APTs 
were in Glasgow, with others scattered across the decaying industrial and mining 
heartlands of Ayrshire, Dunbartonshire, Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire. 
Quite independent of the community regeneration work, primarily focused on these 
council housing estates, there was another entirely separate area-based housing 
improvement programme focused primarily on 19th century industrial districts, and 
specifically Glasgow, which still possessed a substantial residue of tenement slums 
which had eluded the city’s extensive clearance programme (Robertson, 1992). 
Housing Treatment Areas, enacted in 1969, were soon replaced by Housing Action 
Areas (HAAs) in 1974, which sought to bring about targeted basic area-based 
improvements via enhanced improvement and later repair grants. The focus of these 
awards was on statutorily defined Below Tolerable Standard (BTS) slum housing, 
properties that would have in the past been demolished. To support this programme 
the Housing Corporation in Scotland encouraged the growth of small community-
based housing associations who improved, then rented out these properties to the 
previous residents (Robertson & Bailey, 1996). Many community workers, with direct 
Urban Aid experience, helped create these community-based associations 
(Robertson, 2012). Over the subsequent forty years, the quality of the renovation 
work increased, enhanced by new build housing, plus the addition of a variety of 
local social and employment facilities creating a unique and successful community 
approach to regeneration. Housing association HAA renewal work was joined, in the 
late 1980s, by six ‘community ownership’ pilots, targeted on a few places across 
Glasgow’s vast swath of peripheral council housing. Glasgow District Council had 
tried to create their own approach, utilising improvement grant monies, but financially 
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and politically the Scottish Office forced them into the housing association funding 
model (Clapham et al., 1991). And again, there was no direct tie up between housing 
investment and Urban Aid monies. 
The evaluation of the entire Scottish HAA programme, involving the improvement of 
some 47,000 properties, noted the success of this Glasgow focused housing 
association approach, with low-income groups directly benefiting from the improved 
housing resulting from this investment, rather than being displaced as a result of 
‘gentrification’. There were also other benefits noted, namely the creation of locally-
based housing organisations which provided local residents with professional staff 
resources to pursue local improvement agendas with public officials, both locally and 
nationally. However, it was also noted that as a result of the associations’ allocation 
policies a localised concentration of poor households was emerging (Robertson and 
Bailey, 1996). 
Success, but on different terms, was also recorded in relation to the other HAA 
programme, focused in Edinburgh, which utilised improvement grants solely for 
property owners. In this case younger high income groups moved in, inflating local 
house prices and enhancing the economic base of once deprived localities. The 
problem here was that the housing agency commissioning the evaluation, Scottish 
Homes, was unable to define what successful regeneration actually constituted. 
Hence these two approaches to regeneration, the Glasgow housing association one 
resulting in limited gentrification, and the Edinburgh one largely predicated on 
gentrification, were each considered a success (Bailey and Robertson, 1997). The 
neighbourhood focus, with local accountability to tenants and residents exercised 
through association management committees, is still strong in Glasgow, where these 
organisations now constitute the city’s largest social landlord grouping, owning some 
50,000 units, just over half the city’s entire social housing stock. 
So, in summary, Scotland’s long preferred approach to regeneration had focussed 
on improving poor quality pre-1919 tenement housing, initially in the 1930s via slum 
clearance procedures, which were then reactivated in the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
Later, the residue slum clearance programme became the focus of subsidised 
improvement grants. Both programmes were focused on defined small areas, or 
neighbourhoods. Quite separately there was an entirely distinct stream of 
regeneration work that had pioneered a distinctive community work focus, funded via 
Urban Aid. Although Urban Aid monies did support the Ferguslie Park CDP, the 
required renewal work depended on council funding, and while community workers 
did help develop Glasgow’s community-based housing associations, this was not 
directly Urban Aid funded. The then separation of local government into two tiers in 
the mid-1970s helped to institutionalise this separation. Regional Councils dealt with 
strategic level services such as education, planning and social work, and thus Urban 
Aid, while housing investment, whether council housing or private improvement 
grants, was a District Council function. Further, it was also politically hard for District 
Councils to admit that their previous solutions to both slum clearance and 
overcrowding, the small inner area clearance schemes and vast peripheral housing 
estates, now needed regeneration themselves. Grudging construction standards, a 
complete lack of place planning, plus the omission of basic community services such 
as schools, shopping and entertainment, now combined with rapid physical 
deterioration and high unemployment, the consequence of rapid de-industrialisation, 
to accelerate their demise. So although improved housing per se did produce a 
positive impact upon people’s quality of life and well-being, especially in relation to 
mental health (see Go Well, 2013), such an overtly physically dominant approach to 
regeneration had long been criticised for being too narrowly focussed, obscuring the 
need to adopt a more holistic approach incorporating both social and, crucially, 
economic aspects into the regeneration mix (Fyfe, 2009). For fifty years policy had 
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hardly altered, in that housing, economic development and latterly community 
development, pursued their own distinct agendas, but that was about to change. 
Pioneering partnerships 
Scottish regeneration policy was refocused by the Conservative administration’s 
‘New Life for Urban Scotland' (Scottish Office, 1988a), a decade after it came to 
power. This multi-agency, multi-sectorial project focused on four run‐down and 
deprived housing estates, one of which was in the constituency of the then Scottish 
Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, and another was the Ward of Glasgow District Council 
leader Pat Lally (Kintrea, 1996). ‘New Life’ brought together the government’s 
housing, economic and training agencies, as well as relevant local authorities, under 
Scottish Office leadership, into a pioneering ‘partnership’ approach that pursued 
area-based regeneration within the peripheral council housing estates of Castlemilk, 
Glasgow; Ferguslie Park, Paisley; Wester Hailes, Edinburgh; and Whitfield, Dundee, 
over a decade from 1989. Rather than a separate budget being set for each estate, 
or for the partnerships in total, funding came via the partners existing budgets, albeit 
that in the case of Scottish Homes an earmarked budget was created. 
In large measure this repeated an approach pioneered by the Glasgow Eastern Area 
Renewal (GEAR) project, introduced by the then Labour administration, which also 
ran for a decade, from 1976, involving £200m of public investment, the only real 
difference being the focus here was on an old industrial district, rather than large 
council estates. Arguably partnership working had emerged earlier, through the 
corporate planning principles pursued by Strathclyde Regional Council, used to 
produce its statutorily defined Regional Report (SRC, 1976). From that emerged the 
‘Social Strategy for the Eighties’ which sought to operationalise this strategy via inter 
departmental and agency working (SRC, 1983; Young, 1999). 
Interestingly, evaluations of both ‘New Life’ and GEAR came to identical conclusions, 
namely that while physical housing renewal had proved highly successful, enhancing 
both living conditions and the wider environment, the social and economic 
dimensions languished far behind, in terms of both available resources and impacts 
(Deloitte et el., 1982; Donnison and Middleton, 1987; Cambridge Policy Consultants, 
1999; Hayton, 1993: Turok and Hopkins, 1998). Two-thirds of the £485m spent on 
‘New Life’ went on housing, either improving the 13,000 existing houses, or building 
new ones. Council tenure fell from 96 to 56 per cent, with housing associations 
rather than owner occupation being the main beneficiary (Cambridge Policy 
Consultants, 1999). A less dramatic but similar tenure shift occurred in GEAR, where 
associations grew at the expense of private renting and low cost owner occupation. 
Similar conclusions were also drawn by the NDC programme evaluation in England, 
in that holistic regeneration appeared best suited to physical, rather than economic, 
or social regeneration (McCarthy, 2007). Within the Scottish case this was hardly 
surprising, given the long history of physical renewal, and the fact that a dedicated 
housing agency, with a substantial annual budget and a proven delivery approach 
involving community-based housing associations and co-operatives, was responsible 
for delivering the housing outcomes. Other agencies, by contrast, found themselves 
outwith their comfort zone, on a steep learning curve, pursuing an initiative which 
was never a core strategic priority. Stripping out physical investment in housing 
regeneration, the spend by these various regeneration initiatives on economic and 
social services of one kind or another was miniscule in relation to the inputs of 
mainstream providers in the fields of education, health, social welfare and 
employment (McGregor, 2009). 
The percentage of people working within the East End did not alter over the ten 
years of the GEAR project, explained by the fact that most new jobs created went to 
people living outwith the local area, while major job losses persisted within heavy 
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industry (Donnison and Middleton, 1988). In 1977 only 36 per cent of the areas adult 
population and 40 per cent of household heads were working (SDA, 1978). In total 
60 per cent of adult males had been unemployed for more than one year, and a high 
proportion of these were unskilled (SDA, 1978). By 1982, it was calculated there was 
a gross increase of 445 jobs within the defined GEAR boundaries, of which just 187 
were local to that locality, a limited response to the 4,000 locally unemployed 
(McArthur, 1987). 
Within Ferguslie, one of the subsequent ‘New Life’ Partnership Areas, the proportion 
of the working age population in employment did increase over the decade, from 28 
to 41 per cent. In Whitfield, the change was stronger, from 42 to 62 per cent, 
whereas Castlemilk remained constant, at 38 to 36 per cent, while Wester Hailes 
actually fell in from 57 to 48 per cent (Cambridge Policy Consultants, 1999). Isolating 
wider regional economic effects again proved impossible, with local population 
dynamics being thought to be a contributory factor within Wester Hailes, with those 
securing employment moving out to be replaced by those unemployed. However, 
such turnover, or selective migration, assumed within deprived neighbourhoods, has 
recently been questioned by UK research using Census data (Bailey and Livingstone, 
2008). Building on previous work it shows that by controlling for age, in that young 
people move more until they settle down to have their own families, then turnover 
within deprived neighbourhoods is not noticeably higher than other places (Bailey 
and Livingstone, 2007). 
Partnership working was also explicitly based on the principle of resident 
involvement, drawing on self-help ideology and lessons from previous community-
based renewal projects. However, the evaluation concluded that more thought and 
work was needed to address inequalities in resources between the community 
representatives and other partners (Cambridge Policy Consultants, 1999). Drawing 
on evidence gleaned from the Ferguslie Partnership, Kintrea (1996) found that, in the 
early years, community interests had been largely set aside, while the more powerful 
members of the partnership pursued their own agendas. The reason for this was not 
simply that community interests were ignored, but rather that the political objectives 
of government, the complexity of the project and its timeframe all conspired to 
prevent meaningful local engagement. This also concurred with Hastings' (1996) 
findings, when examining both Castlemilk and Wester Hailes, that partnership 
working was largely a hypothetical concept rather than a reality, given that 
simultaneous reciprocal or mutual transformations between all the partners was 
absent. Again there were strong parallels with previous criticisms levelled at 
participation practices pursued within the GEAR project (Nelson, 1980). 
Economic disconnect 
De-industrialisation and economic restructuring were core considerations in 
explaining the rapid degeneration and consequent ballooning of unemployment in 
West Central Scotland, and other old industrial districts, throughout the 1970s and 
1980s (Keating and Boyle, 1986). Macroeconomic policy was, however, kept quite 
separate from regeneration policy and programmes (Robertson, 1998). Since the 
advent of Special Areas, in the 1930s, to provide industrial estates and develop the 
initial New Towns in the immediate post-war years, economic policy had been tightly 
controlled by the Scottish Office, and its economic development bodies: Locate in 
Scotland, the five New Town Development Corporations and its dedicated economic 
agencies, whether the SDA, its successor Scottish Enterprise and their then Local 
Enterprise Company (LEC) network (Boyle, 1993; Moore and Booth, 1989). 
As previously touched upon, employment, training and economic development has 
never been a core component of Scottish regeneration practice, rather it has tended 
to be pursued separately. Scotland did not have an equivalent to Urban 
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Development Corporations, at least until the creation of Urban Regeneration 
Companies in the mid-2000s. Ever since the 1930s the Scottish Office had kept 
economic planning and its delivery quite separate and distinct from regeneration. 
The SDA, established in 1975, was given two roles, that of promoting sectorial 
developments within the Scottish economy and addressing the problems of so-called 
‘stress areas’ such as the Garnock Valley, Clydebank and Glasgow’s East End 
(Keating and Boyle, 1986: McCarthy, 2007). The SDA saw its role primarily in 
pursuing sectorial economic more familiar to industrial economists (Wannop and 
Leclerc, 1987). The agency's first Chief Executive was reluctant to accept 
responsibility for co-ordinating the GEAR project, as he considered it diversionary 
(Wannop and Leclerc, 1987). So although, at face value, GEAR appeared to link 
area economic development with regeneration ambitions, the SDA was keen to 
disassociate itself from this objective (Keating and Boyle, 1986; McCarthy, 2007). 
The only regeneration projects the SDA actively managed were those where they 
took the lead: the Garnock Valley Task Force, the Maryhill Corridor Project, Glasgow, 
the Leith Project in Edinburgh, the Blackness project in Dundee, and later, Dundee 
Waterfront and Glasgow’s Crown Street Regeneration in the Gorbals. These projects, 
unlike GEAR, had clear objectives, agreed timeframes and defined partner 
responsibilities (Gulliver, 1884). That said, environmental improvement which 
amounted to a significant element of any area-based initiative was an activity where 
there was a degree of joint working between the SDA and other regeneration actors, 
who often acted as the Agency’s delivery vehicle for such work. 
Further, building on their experiences in developing Enterprise Zones, on the site of 
the old Singer sewing machine factory within Clydebank being the best known, a 
small number of identical advanced workspace units were constructed by the SDA in 
the GEAR, Leith and Maryhill projects. As with the Enterprise Zones, there was a 
criticism that these failed to generate new employment, but rather merely relocated 
existing businesses from outwith the defined regeneration area (McArthur, 1988). 
Vocational training, outwith the mainstream education system, was not distinctly 
Scottish. In 1964 a network of powerful, statutory, independent Industry Training 
Boards (ITB) were established in response to the perceived failure of employer-led 
voluntarism to secure an adequate supply of skilled labour (Anderson and Fairley, 
1983). While the largest ITBs treated Scotland as an operating area, most did not, 
with policies developed for the UK as a whole. In time they were criticised for not 
taking account of regional policy, which at that time covered Scotland entirely, as 
well as not understanding small firms, nor local labour markets (Fairley, 1989). The 
Manpower Services Commission (MSC) was brought into being in 1974 to co-
ordinate ITBs, but quickly had to respond to the growing problem of youth 
unemployment. Again, this was a UK body, based in Sheffield, and answerable to 
the UK Parliament, not the Scottish Office with its economic development powers, 
hence the concern that MSC training programmes were disconnected from economic 
development priorities (Brown and Fairley, 1987). 
In December 1988 two government White Papers (DoE, 1988; Scottish Office, 1988b) 
proposed radical changes to economic policy, by advocating supply side economics 
and stressing the need to create and sustain a flexible labour market with vocational 
training to explicitly addressing the needs of industry and business. In 1991 both the 
SDA and HIDB were abolished, and combined their responsibilities and powers with 
the former MSC into two new bodies, Scottish Enterprise (SE) and Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise (HIE). Both agencies were legally required to decentralise their 
operations and budgets to local partnerships or companies, bringing about the 22 
Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) network. The SE budget for 1992/93 amounted 
to £449m, with Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Edinburgh & Lothians LECs taking some 
40 per cent (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995). In 1993/94 SE spent £395m on its four 
programmes: £137 on enterprise, £88m on environment, £79m on youth training and 
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£91m on adult training. In that same year HIE spent £1m on community action grants, 
£17m on marketing and projects, £5m on environmental renewal, £13m on training 
and £30m on enterprise assistance (Fairley and Lloyd, 1995). Training monies came 
directly from UK government sources, but as unemployment declined in the 1990s, 
so did these monies. 
So within 20 years the Scottish Office had moved from having oversight of industrial 
policy to covering all the main aspects of economic development and also training. 
Yet despite this there was still a disconnect between economic development and 
training goals. Training under the LECs was geared to the interests of local 
businesses, and at the same time the strategic emphasis of SE and HIE was on 
business interests. There was a further disconnect, in that both organisations 
focused on business not welfare, as regeneration policy found itself characterised.  
The economic initiatives pursued within the four ‘New Life’ Partnership Areas 
focused primarily on training and education for the young and long-term unemployed. 
From the mid-1990s there was also a concerted attempt within Scottish Homes, as 
the core regeneration body, to promote local labour clauses with the main 
contractors and their sub-contractors of projects they funded, so that capital monies 
spent on housing regeneration could be seen to have a locally focused economic 
spin off. However, EU tender competition rules and the actual limited implementation 
of such clauses ensured they never became a mainstream element of regeneration 
practice. So despite partnership working becoming an explicit part of regeneration 
projects, Scottish Enterprise and their LEC network, were able to keep themselves at 
arm’s length from those engaged in what was primarily housing renewal.  
At this point, mention should again be made of Strathclyde Regional Council’s ‘Social 
Strategy’ and its attempts, again via Urban Aid, to support the development of 
community businesses, now termed social enterprises. Strathclyde Community 
Business, funded by the Council, employed 30 staff to encourage and advise local 
community organisations, in estates suffering high unemployment how to establish 
commercial ventures (Young, 1999). By the mid-1980s there were some 50 
companies, employing 25 unemployed people, on average, who were additionally 
supported by a board composed of ten local people (Young, 1999). The short-term 
nature of funding and the types of businesses activity undertaken, such as ground 
maintenance and security of construction sites, ensured few if any survived. 
Paralleling this was the establishment of the Wise Group in 1983, which developed a 
major training programme for the unemployed on the back of a major home 
insulation contract involving a large proportion of Glasgow District Council’s 175,000 
council homes. This intermediate labour market programme focused on council 
housing with a poor thermal standard, at that time almost ubiquitous in Glasgow 
given poor construction and minimal on-going maintenance. It was not specifically 
targeted to renewal area. From this the Wise Group went on to develop a nationwide 
profile in providing training and received many accolades for its work by the New 
Labour Government in the 1990s. 
Economic development was seen by governments of whatever hue, and its 
economic agencies, to be primarily about ensuring future economic successes, 
building opportunities, whereas regeneration was characterised as being about doing 
the necessary to manage the negative consequences of economic failure. 
Regeneration steps in to counter 'market failure'. But Scottish Enterprise saw no role 
for economic development within regeneration areas. Scottish Enterprise, throughout 
the 1990s, operated an economic shorthand for each of Scotland’s four cities: 
Edinburgh – ‘Finance and bio-tech’; Aberdeen - ‘Oil and renewables’; Dundee - 
‘Biotech and games’, and Glasgow - ‘Need’. Such labelling reveals much about 
prevailing attitudes within the government’s economic development agency, an 
attitude which has been consistent throughout the post-war era. When the Glasgow 
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Development Agency, the city’s LEC, presented a business plan which sought to 
engage more fully with regeneration areas the Scottish Enterprise Board failed to 
endorse it. Their opinion was that funding regeneration areas was simply ‘putting 
good money after bad’ (personal interview 2 ). Both Scottish Enterprise and its 
predecessor saw their role as being one of focusing on economic ‘opportunities’, and 
outwith a few specific service areas, such a city centre commercial property and 
tourism, Glasgow was not viewed in that light (McCarthy, 2007). Given the city had 
long been the prime focus of regeneration activity, being the most deprived city in the 
UK, the omission of this economic dimension would always be highly problematic, 
findings that accord with recent work by North and Syrett (2008) who argue that 
neighbourhood renewal in England has been hamstrung by the lack of integration 
with economic development at wider spatial scales. The notion that sustained 
employment could be generated on the back of major regeneration projects 
occurring across the city, so-called ‘housing led regeneration’, was fanciful given the 
scale of the city’s problems. Yet this was one of the few economic cards Glasgow 
was dealt. 
So politically and administratively central government saw itself as being in control of 
the higher order functions of government, most notably economic policy, with local 
government being left to sort the more mundane administrative tasks, in the main, 
associated with delivering social services. While central government controlled the 
purse strings and modus operandi of regeneration, both in its physical and social 
guises, economic aspects outwith training and skills were kept distinct and separate 
(Rae, 2011). The Scottish Office, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, irrespective of 
the administration's political hue, also effectively denied that unemployment and 
associated deprivation was a structural issue. Rather they preferred socio-
pathological explanations, which viewed area degeneration as being caused, in the 
main, by those who were resident (Hastings, 2000; Mathews, 2010). While CDPs 
and the Inner Areas Studies (DoE, 1977) foregrounded structural explanations for 
urban decay, this rhetoric was not accepted by the incoming Conservative 
administration, nor later by New Labour.  
Sticking or changing 
As already noted, the physical, social and economic aspects of regeneration were 
the responsibility of different policy and practice actors, whether in central 
government, its various agencies, or in local government. They had never operated 
to a commonly agreed format, thus the high degree of organisational duplication and 
disagreements between these different organisations, or parts of organisations, over 
budgets, responsibilities and approaches to pursue. Thus historically the 
administration of regeneration involved extensive and expensive bureaucracy which, 
in turn, generated further complex administration structures and what at times 
appeared to be a perpetual stream of organisational change and restructuring, which 
was both the cause of and reaction to new policy initiatives. Partnership working was 
the means to address such strategic and organisational problems and had become 
the regeneration norm, but has undergone a series of subtle changes both politically 
and organisationally since its introduction under ‘New Life’, if not GEAR. 
Traditionally government, its agencies and local government had worked together on 
regeneration matters, but largely independently, with the Scottish Office setting 
                                               
2
 To help inform and initially scope out this review eight interviews were conducted with people who had a direct 
involvement in planning and funding different aspects of regeneration work. One had been a senior elected 
member in a Regional Council, one held a senior planning position in the Scottish Government, two had 
previously headed-up regeneration agencies, three had held senior positions in Scottish Homes/Communities 
Scotland, on the capital planning and funding operations while the last held a senior managerial position in a 
Local Enterprise Company.   
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strategic objectives and funding priorities, while local authorities spent the emergent 
budgets on different projects. Under the Conservatives greater use was made of 
agencies to deliver programmes, a practice that had a longstanding history within 
Scottish Office administration. What changed was scale, in that the Conservative 
administration considered agencies to be a more effective means of delivering on 
their policy objectives, especially the highly politicised arena of housing policy. This 
was, in large part, party political, in that throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s 
Scottish local authorities were, in the main Labour controlled, while the UK 
government, and thus Scottish Office administration was Conservative. Given their 
ultimate control of housing and regeneration budgets, Conservative administrations 
assumed the lead role, an approach greatly resented by Labour local authorities, 
who considered themselves the legitimate authority in determining housing and 
regeneration priorities within their locality. 
‘New Life’ added further to this tension because, in paralleling Action for Cities in 
England (HMSO, 1988), a strongly Conservative, if not neo-liberal ideology emerged, 
arguing that Scotland had become overly dependent on the State through the 
housing and benefits system, impeding ‘natural’ entrepreneurial activity (Scottish 
Office, 1988a; 1988b; Kintrea, 1996; Hastings, 2000). To address such failings, a 
partnership of private and public sectors would be created, charged with involving 
affected communities. These communities would be made responsible for 
themselves, and this, in turn, would reinvigorate their entrepreneurial spirit through 
active business involvement, an emphasis on skills training and extra financial 
support for start-up companies (Scottish Office, 1988a; Mathews, 2010). There was 
an ideological tie up here with the creation of SE and HIE, as discussed earlier 
(Scottish Office, 1988b). Interestingly, this focus chimes with Deakin and Edwards 
(1993) view that regeneration policy was perceived as a route to develop an 
‘enterprise culture’ ideology, and Raco's (2009) later work on the politics of aspiration 
underpinning New Labour urban policy. Regeneration was thus spearheading an 
ideological crusade, and in the process the language employed to describe this 
policy held with adopted pathological explanations of urban deprivation (Hastings, 
1996; 2000). 
So there is little surprise that this approach, combining partnership working and 
social pathology, moved into the next generation of area-based regeneration 
initiatives, the Priority Partnership Areas (PPAs). Mirroring the initial partnerships 
they stuck with the more holistic view of regeneration, involving identical economic, 
social and physical solutions. However, rather than government selecting their 
preferred locations for intervention, local authorities and their partners were invited to 
submit plans for partnership working within a specific area. Local need had to be 
demonstrated, so any PPA required to be within the most disadvantaged 10 per cent 
Census districts in Scotland. In addition, bids were to be judged on the quality of the 
proposals and the extent to which they demonstrated partnership working, within a 
local strategic context. 
Securing funding was however competitive, mirroring both City Challenge and the 
Single Regeneration Budget models in England (Hastings, 1996). Out of 29 
submissions, only 12 were approved for ten year funding, causing further disquiet 
amongst local authorities who argued the selection process was unfair. This 
produced a review of unsuccessful bids, which concluded the need for clearer 
guidelines and greater process transparency (Turok and Hopkins, 1997; Taylor et al., 
1999). Interestingly, it also reported that 14 of the unsuccessful 17 bids were already 
operating some form of partnership arrangement to take forward the proposed 
regeneration work. Community and local business representation was, however, less 
evident. Roberts (1996) described such partnerships as 'impermanent alliances', 
formed for the immediate purpose of levering out comprehensively allocated public 
sector resources. The political furore, however, resulted in a further nine smaller 
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scale projects receiving Urban Programme funding, now re-badged as the 
Regeneration Programme. 
An earlier review of the Urban Programme which, as noted previously, funded Urban 
Aid projects, argued for a more strategic focus, by co-ordinating and integrating with 
other projects at the local level (Scottish Office, 1993). Henceforth, future funding 
would be required to combine with other initiatives pursued by public, private and 
voluntary partnerships (Scottish Office, 1993). Subsequent applications to the Urban 
Programme would thus require local authorities to specify just how the project 
contributed to the local authorities wider planning strategy, thus effectively changing 
the basis of this distinct source of regeneration funding; a community resource for 
poor and deprived neighbourhoods became part of physical regeneration. This also 
helps explains the increased funding secured by Scottish Homes during this period, 
up to 1996. 
It was at this time, and in part because of the increase in Scottish Homes funding, 
that an overtly housing focused initiative sought to deliver housing led-regeneration 
to run-down areas across Scotland. A total of 15 Small Urban Renewal Initiatives 
(SURIs) were launched in three waves between 1990 and 1995. Each sought to 
expand housing choice and quality, while levering in both public and private funding 
through a multi-agency approach (Pawson et al., 1998). As a housing venture, it 
succeeded in physical terms, as conditions improved and tenure was diversified. 
This was achieved by focussing attention and resources on places long ignored by 
Scottish policy. These new housing developments also had a socio-economic impact, 
both in terms of generating short-term construction employment, and through 
changing the local social mix, given the advent of mixed tenure (Pawson et al., 1998). 
However, the evaluation again noted the weak linkages between housing renewal 
and economic development, in that apart from construction employment economic 
development failed to feature. Inadequate attention was also spent on baseline and 
monitoring data limiting the capacity to evaluate. Finally, the commitment between 
partners was considered weak, largely because of this programmes ‘top down’ 
imposition, which also ensured the relative absence of community participation 
(Pawson et al., 1998). 
From 1997, with the return of Labour governments in both the UK, and, in particular, 
in the re-created Scottish Parliament from 1999, there was a strong political desire to 
re-position local government as the key local strategic vehicle, in planning renewal 
and service delivery, while moving away from government agencies dictating what 
should be done. Such agencies were now increasingly expected to work on better 
aligning their strategic priorities with those of local government, through further 
initiatives to develop partnership working. That said, budgets were still kept separate, 
thus ensuring continued horse-trading over projects and commitments. Over time, 
government’s reliance upon agencies, both as strategic and delivery vehicles began 
to wane, and has now all but disappeared. But before this happened there was a 
brief resurrection of the old Urban Aid ethos and focus, reflecting its strong local 
authority political heritage, with the advent of Social Inclusion Partnerships (SIPs). 
Two years after the change of government, the remaining PPAs and RPAs were 
rolled into the SIPs. Regeneration policy became key to the Scottish Executive’s 
agreed social policy, under the Labour Liberal Democrat administration. The 
continuity of policy is well illustrated by the consultation document ‘Social Exclusion 
in Scotland’ (Scottish Office, 1998) where it states: “government is committed to a 
comprehensive approach to area regeneration … to improve the life chances of 
people living in some of the most deprived communities … The policy is based upon 
New Life for Urban Scotland partnerships which have effectively tackled many of the 
problems of social exclusion by adopting a holistic multi-agency approach” (Scottish 
Office, 1998: 4). This accords with the earlier orthodoxy accorded to Scottish 
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regeneration, which argued continuity, rather than change, and success, never 
failure (McCrone, 1991; Hayton, 1999). Given such positivity the lack of a PPA 
evaluation, to provide evidence of this success is surprising. The evaluation of the 
Regeneration Programme, which focused on organisational structures and modes of 
working, proved lukewarm (Cambridge Economic Associates, 2001). It found that 
partnership working had brought considerable organisational benefits, although the 
nature and involvement of partners was highly variable. Further, mainstream budget 
bending by partners within the nine target areas was considered both slow and 
variable, leaving them to conclude more progress needed to be made. 
Donald Dewar, then Scottish Secretary and subsequently Scotland’s first, First 
Minister viewed SIPs as core to promoting social justice. At their launch he stated: 
"Scottish circumstances differ from England in that those suffering exclusion … are 
disproportionately concentrated in specific communities, and there has been more 
experience of effective urban regeneration policies originally pioneered in Scotland 
and maintained in later years by local government and others" (Dewar, 1998: 1). 
Building on established arrangements and experience, the emphasis was to be on 
the most needy members of society; co-ordination and filling the gaps between 
existing programmes; and, finally, attempting to prevent people becoming socially 
excluded. There was also a feeling that the goals were shared between both tiers of 
government, and that communities would also be tied in as full partners (McCarthy, 
1999). This also chimes with the belief that Scotland is a more socially just society, 
when compared to England, despite evidence showing both nations display 
remarkably similar levels of social inequality, if London and the South East are 
excluded from the analysis (Bell and Eiser, 2013). 
While funding for both PPAs and RPAs came from the Urban Programme, SIPs 
budgets came from a new fund, the £345m Community Regeneration Fund, albeit 
that this was largely made up from the old Urban Programme monies, and a £100m 
top-sliced from Scottish Homes (Scottish Executive, 2002). Investment in area-based 
SIPs stuck with needs-based criteria, but in future this would be derived from a newly 
created Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SiMD) which more accurately 
calculated deprivation levels, based on a specially created index (Gibb et al., 1999; 
Lloyd, 2002; McCarthy, 1999). There was also to be a strong emphasis on 
measuring outputs. Tangible improvements would be measured through utilising 
indicators of economic and social change to trace the improving conditions for these 
most disadvantaged communities (SIPs Monitoring and Evaluation Unit, 1998).  
The programme goals, the selection of targeted areas, plus the retention of 
competition for resources, led McCarthy (2007) to argue SIPs closely mirrored the 
English New Deal for Communities (NDCs). However, much has been made of the 
distinctive inclusion focus outlined by ‘Social Justice: A Scotland where everyone 
matters’, in preference to social exclusion, the term applied in England (Scottish 
Office, 1999; Lupton, 2013). This was essentially a semantic point, in that inclusion 
was employed to indicate incorporation within mainstream society, whereas 
exclusion suggested social distancing. The actual programme focus north and south 
of the border was, thus, broadly similar. 
In terms of scale, the 21 pre-existing area-based SIPs were carried forward into this 
revised program (but given their original starting date most had concluded their work 
by the end of 2003) and a further 14 area-based projects were added drawing 
directly from SiMD data. Further, a more transparent and engaging selection process 
involving the newly created Social Inclusion Network, composed of selected 
regeneration professionals who made recommendation to the Scottish Executive. In 
addition to these area-based SIPs, 14 Thematic SIPs were introduced, focusing on 
young people: one seeking to help Glasgow women out of prostitution (Routes Out), 
while two covered minority ethnic communities (FRAE Fife and the Glasgow Anti-
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Racist Alliance). There were no projects covering disability, however, nor people with 
addiction issues (Macpherson, 2006; Macpherson et al., 2007). So while promoted 
as being innovative, and evidence based, the retention of competitive bidding and 
the broadening focus arguably marked a return to their Urban Aid roots.   
The core ambition of ‘Social Inclusion – Opening the Door to a Better Scotland’ 
(Scottish Executive, 2002b) was achieving social justice for all, with particular 
targeted strategies for the poorest places. This contrasted with England where 
regeneration strategies focused solely on the poorest communities (Lupton, 2013). 
The distinctiveness of Scottish policy, at this time, was characterised as being less 
about transforming areas, through major investment, and more about filling gaps 
between existing programmes (Lupton, 2013). While it is correct to say the Scottish 
approach built on longer established city-wide partnerships, in contrast with England, 
the actual focus and investment, up till 2006, was still predominantly area-based. 
Others make a valid point that both PPAs and SIPs articulated a stronger 
commitment to community empowerment. Cameron and Davoudi (1998) argue 
policy had moved away from income distribution and defining what constitutes an 
adequate level of income, to one involving a critical appreciation of the complexities 
of social and institutional restructuring, dis-empowerment and community capacity 
building. This chimes with Pearce (1993) who had earlier argued the policy 
framework had to be about the real delegation of power and responsibility to those 
communities experiencing poverty. Empowerment, as noted below, did not, however, 
emerge as a strong feature in SIPs evaluations.  
Further, at this time ‘Better Communities in Scotland: Closing the gap’ (Scottish 
Executive, 2002a) saw securing higher incomes as a prime goal, given lack of 
access to employment had been long noted as the dominant indicator of exclusion 
(McGregor and McConnachie, 1998; McGregor et al., 1988). Again, the disconnect 
between the policy rhetoric and its reality of its implementation, is revealed, in that 
the emergent projects did not overtly focus on employment and skills. As noted 
earlier, the LEC network, which had core responsibility for training, undertook this 
work outwith the area focus of the SIPs framework. 
Leading up to issuing the policy paper, ‘Social Justice: A Scotland where everyone 
matters?’ (Scottish Executive, 2006). ODS Consulting (2006) undertook an 
overarching evaluation of the entire SIPs programme drawing evidence from a series 
of 27 separate evaluations carried out in 2003 on each SIP which had been 
established in 1999. 
Collectively SIPs adopted a catholic approach to defining ‘regeneration’: activities 
embraced employability, improving health outcomes as well as traditional housing 
and environmental improvements. But again it was the physical improvements, 
housing constructed or improved, that proved tangible and thus measurable 
outcomes. Delivering on the wider social benefits still proved elusive. A collective 
lack of meaningful local baseline data ensured that measuring performance proved 
hard, if not impossible, as it was not possible to determine delivery on agreed 
objectives (ODS Consulting, 2006). The Core Compulsory Indicators, to be 
universally applied within all area-based SIPs, also failed as many did not have the 
skills, time, nor inclination to undertake the demanded data collection and analysis. 
So while data existed on the many thousands of individuals who had been involved 
in, and probably benefited from SIP projects, there was limited evidence as to the 
extent to which these projects and such participation actually acted to reduce social 
exclusion. It was also found that some of the agreed objectives could not be met 
using only the resources available to the SIP. In common with the previous 
Regeneration Programme, again the evaluations had difficulty in identifying if 
mainstream budgets had been bent to add support to this work. Locality budgeting, 
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badged as ‘community budgeting’ was initially seen as a means to identify such 
expenditure, but was abandoned following a pilot in part of Glasgow’s vast 
Easterhouse estate. There was also a pilot ‘participatory budgeting’ exercise pursued 
in the Govanhill district of Glasgow, involving £200k (Harkins and Egan, 2012). Joint 
budgeting, although remaining elusive and largely untried, is considered to be a 
necessary development within the Christie Commission recommendations to 
improve the delivery of public services. 
Partnership working had developed and improved, but there was still a lack of cross 
cutting approaches. Evaluations contained substantial information on community 
engagement, community capacity building and the use of the Community 
Engagement Fund. However, the link between these activities and the extent to 
which it made a difference had not been developed. Further, while engaging with 
communities was also felt to have improved, the ‘new’ SIPs were failing to address 
equality issues, despite extensive guidance on this issue (ODS Consulting, 2006). 
There was also evidence that a number of SIPs struggled from the outset to 
establish organisational structures, re-allocate or recruit staff, or implement a 
framework to allocate project funding. There were also major weaknesses in setting 
targets and objectives and measuring performance identified at both local and 
national levels. While there was evidence that SIPs had supported projects that had 
developed good practice, evidence of innovation was less frequent. 
So despite a more robust selection process, a contractual requirement for an agreed 
implementation plan, and annual structured reporting to both the Scottish Executive 
and Communities Scotland (the successor to Scottish Homes), the inability of 
regeneration projects to measure outcomes still characterised their work. Although 
blind to their wider influence and impacts, SIPs were confident that partnership 
working, community engagement and the perceived potential to bend mainstream 
budgets to benefit poorer neighbourhoods would, over time, improve matters. Such 
evidence also implied that the actual management of regeneration had, in twenty 
years, become as much of a goal as what was being delivered. 
Planning not intervening 
By 2006 partnership working had become the mantra for local government 
management, a narrative that gathered pace throughout the 1990s, before becoming 
legally defined as Community Planning, under the Local Government in Scotland Act, 
2003. This prescribed approach to joint working was agreed between the then 
Scottish Office and Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA), immediately 
following the Labour Liberal Coalition victory in the first Scottish Parliament elections 
in 1999 (Rogers et al., 2000). Subsequently, successive governments have built 
upon this mode of working: the Labour Liberal Coalition (2003-07), the SNP Minority 
Administration (2007-11) and SNP Majority Government (2011 to present). 
What is peculiar about Community Planning was the speed by which it became 
mainstreamed and packaged as ‘the’ sole means to achieve ‘strategic planning’ 
within local authority jurisdictions, now defined as ‘communities’ (Robertson, 2001). 
In part, it was an organisational response to what had become a congested policy 
and delivery environment, created during the long period of UK Conservative 
government. The other driver was New Labour’s commitment to social justice. 
One consequence of this change was the creation of the Better Neighbourhood 
Services Fund (BNSF), which ran between 2001 to 2005, and was designed to help 
local authorities and their ‘community planning partners’ deliver real and substantial 
service improvements within twelve Pathfinder Areas, to narrow the gap between 
disadvantaged communities and the wider population (Sheil and Clark, 2004). The 
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focus was on key ‘inclusion’ themes: children and young people; community safety; 
employability; care for older people; and health. The initial three-year £90m fund 
received an extra £32m to fund a year extension. Again, as with SIPs progress was 
to be measured against agreed outcomes set for each project, through what was 
termed a Local Outcome Agreement (LOA). 
In reviewing progress Sheil and Clark (2004: 12) noted that designing customised 
LOAs, to meet the needs of particular communities, proved challenging.  
“Consultation, baseline information, and considerable reflection on the most 
appropriate outcome indicators are required. These issues were not fully 
appreciated at the outset, and more guidance and training about how to 
approach the task of designing an outcome based programme would have been 
desirable.” 
Despite this concern the evidence-based approach was endorsed, as it offered: “a 
coherent and logical framework within which to develop new policies to combat 
disadvantage and subsequently assess their effectiveness”. While recognising these 
demands and challenges, several participating authorities stated that they had now 
adopted a similar approach in other areas of their work suggesting that corporate 
planning and bending mainstream budgets was now on the agenda.  
This was later developed into a parallel policy initiative, the Scottish Executive’s 
Closing the Opportunity Gap (CtOG), which again explored how mainstream services 
could be better co-ordinated to tackle social exclusion. Under CtOG three aims and 
six higher level objectives were set, which then tied into 10 lower level objectives, all 
of which were evaluated over seven local authorities. The resulting evaluation, in 
common with those in regeneration, proved inconclusive, given the lack of available 
monitoring data. However, better systems and planning in the future would ensure 
this was addressed, so the focus again was on process not impact (McKendrick et al, 
2007). 
Another example of where this new orthodoxy initially came together was with the 
creation of the Community Regeneration Fund (CRF), which allocated £318m in 
2006/07 to disadvantaged neighbourhoods, and was tied to local authority 
Regeneration Outcome Agreements (ROA), which ran briefly from 2005-08, before 
being incorporated into Single Outcome Agreements (SOA), which has become the 
core tool for co-ordinating central and local government strategic planning. At this 
time all remaining SIPs were integrated into Community Planning Partnerships, with 
funding coming from CRF, which was composed of the previous SIP and BNSF 
funds, plus the mopping up of some other regeneration monies. 
A vision for delivering social justice was presented by Social Justice: A Scotland 
where everyone matters? (Scottish Executive, 2006b). It argued that, in the past, 
strategies to tackle poverty and injustice had been more about places than people. 
While both mattered this policy advocated a lifecycle approach to regeneration target 
setting so that deprivation would be stopped from becoming “a way of life and being 
passed on through the generations” (Scottish Executive, 2006: 7) So in place of 
area-based interventions the focus moved on to on every child, young person, family, 
older person and community. Delivering social justice thus demanded modern, 
effective government that promoted social justice across all areas of government, so 
that: “achieving our targets will be about more than how much we spend. It will be 
about how we spend, whom we work with and how we organise for change” (Scottish 
Executive, 2006: 7). Again this ties back to both the CtOG work, and that of CRF 
noted earlier. 
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Given this commitment to addressing social justice it is surprising the accompanying 
regeneration policy statement People and place (Scottish Executive, 2006a) adopts 
more of an economic opportunity focus in promoting regeneration, rather than the 
more traditional emphasis upon addressing need (McCarthy, 2007). This very much 
reflected the prevailing mood of the day, given the unprecedented period of 
sustained economic growth. Malcolm Chisholm, Minister for Housing and 
Communities, adopted the descriptors of people, place, partnership and prosperity to 
announce the combined regeneration budget, encompassing the three government 
agencies charged with this task - SE, HIE and CS - , of £2.4bn for the period 2005/06 
to 2008/09, within which £123m was allocated for the City Growth Fund, supporting 
renewal ventures in Scotland’s six cities, and just £318m allocated to disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. It also indicates a degree of political satisfaction, in that poverty 
was now on the wane: 
“Since 1997 significant progress has been made in tackling poverty across 
Scotland – 630,000 people … have been lifted out of absolute poverty and the 
number of children in absolute poverty has halved. Scotland’s employment rate 
is up too – up 3.7 per cent on 1999 and, at 75 per cent, above the UK average 
for the first time in a generation. Meanwhile, unemployment is down by nearly a 
third. But … while good progress has been made, there are still considerable 
differences in quality of life between the most deprived areas and the rest of 
Scotland – differences which compound and reinforce each other at the 
neighbourhood level. (Scottish Executive, 2006a: 9) 
So this also goes some way to explain the downplaying of Scottish policy 
distinctiveness, and the stated desire to mirror the English SRB approach. 
Regeneration was now seen as core to future prosperity and economic growth, so 
encouraging private partnership in executing such work was crucial (Rae, 2011). 
Both the City Growth Fund, which emerged out of the Cities Review (Scottish 
Executive, 2003), and Urban Regeneration Companies (URCs), also reveals 
changed thinking as to what constituted regeneration and how it should be pursued 
(Shiel and Smith-Milne, 2007).  
URCs were a new area-based renewal initiative, but their public private company 
model had long been a feature of Scottish public policy. As distinct ‘business’ entities 
they were expected to operate at arms' length from the partner organisations when 
delivering physical, economic and social regeneration, within a specific 
neighbourhood (Sheil and Smith-Milne, 2007). In taking forward their strategic 
overview, this shared set of objectives and envisaged outcomes had also to embrace 
the affected communities themselves. Initially three were created between 2005 and 
2007, namely, Clydebank, Craigmillar and Raploch. They were later joined by three 
others: Inverclyde, Irvine Bay and the Clyde Gateway project. 
What was new was that this model pursued an overtly private property-led approach 
to regeneration, whereby public investment, in the form of land, development capital 
and also involving some complementary social housing investment, would be used to 
stimulate private housing investment. Land sale receipts, arising from the staged 
sale of owner occupied housing, would then be recycled back into the URC. While 
these public private partnerships were obliged to produce a ROA, across defined 
economic, social and environmental objectives, the Scottish Executive did not see 
the URC as being responsible for the ‘direct’ delivery of the outcomes related to the 
social inclusion themes of worklessness, employability, health, education and quality 
of life (Sheil and Smith-Milne, 2007). The URCs core role was that of regeneration 
catalyst, bringing partners together to ensure that opportunities created by physical 
regeneration were planned and maximised, through drawing in private investment 
from the use of existing public funding streams, or agencies. 
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By the time the URCs were into their development phase the ‘global financial crisis’ 
struck, bringing about the collapse of the private housing market, and with it their 
business model. Social housing investment then fell away, a consequence of related 
deep public expenditure cuts. Clyde Gateway is still functioning, given its role in 
delivering the 2014 Commonwealth Games Sports Village and associated 
infrastructure, largely on the site of the old GEAR project. At the same time it seeks 
to create new business opportunities arising from the M74 extension which sliced 
through a large chunk of derelict land in Glasgow’s east end. It accounts for 20 per 
cent of the recently announced Regeneration Capital Fund Grants for 2014/16, with 
Inverclyde and Irvine Bay making up five per cent of the £27.6m fund (Scottish 
Government, 2013). Five of the 23 funded projects are in Glasgow. The fund was 
developed in partnership with COSLA and local authorities, to support projects that 
will deliver large-scale improvements to deprived areas, and is effectively all that 
remains of area-based regeneration. The only other major area based regeneration 
currently being carried out is by the Glasgow Housing Association (now part of the 
Wheatley Group), the body that took over ownership of Glasgow’s council housing 
stock, following the successful tenant ballot and associated extinguishing off its 
outstanding £1bn capital debt by the Treasury. 
Drowning, not waving  
With the introduction of Single Outcome Agreements (SOA), by the in-coming SNP 
Minority Administration, the re-engineering of local government strategic planning 
was complete. SOAs were the logical successor to Pathfinder ROAs and LOAs, 
which in turn drew from CtOG and CRF. Scotland’s 32 Community Planning 
Partnerships were now required to tie into this outcome-focused approach, whereby 
local government was expected to show how they contribute to the Scottish 
Government’s fifteen defined strategic objectives, as detailed in the National 
Performance Framework (Scottish Government, 2007). Paralleling this, the SNP 
drew up a Concordat with the COSLA whereby, for agreeing to direct their activities 
to meeting the government’s strategic objectives, and for not increasing the Council 
Tax, authorities would be free to determine their own priorities, and all government 
enforced ‘ring fenced’ of budgets was removed (Scottish Government & COSLA, 
2007). 
Local government were now free to set its own local priorities, unhindered by central 
dictate or ‘ring fenced’ budgeting, as long as they could show how they were 
contributing to meeting the Scottish Governments strategic objectives. The SOAs are 
thus expected to further refine strategic planning and co-ordination, with the resulting 
corporate planning document being the core tool to enhance tangible ‘partnerships’ 
and ‘joint working’ (Scottish Government, 2012a). Local authorities and its partners 
were also expected to co-ordinate and bend their mainstream budgets in order to 
improve outputs which would target specified priorities, that could either be a distinct 
deprived neighbourhood, or a particular priority group, as long as either could be 
linked directly back to the Scottish Government’s initial 15, now 16, strategic 
outcomes (Scottish Government, 2012a). The criticism here was that SOAs were 
introduced as part of a refined financial and performance framework, based on 
concepts of rational planning. However, whereas a Treasury model would stress the 
need for a direct link between budgets, outputs and outcomes, SOAs do not possess 
such a direct operational link (Midwinter, 2009). Rather they set down strategic 
ambitions, but do not earmark overall or organisational budgets to ensure these 
ambitions are delivered on. Further, SOAs were originally designed to focus on just 
six indicators for local government, so the growth in indicators it is argued now 
makes the process unmanageable (Midwinter, 2009). Current guidance for SOA still 
stress the six broad themes, with generic references to place-based solutions, but 
the what, how and where aspects noted by Midwinter are still not there. 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 19 
Three years on from Malcolm Chisholm’s examination of the people and place 
dichotomy in regeneration Alex Neil, the incoming SNP Minister for Housing and 
Communities revisited this debate. In contrast to Chisholm he noted that despite 
long-standing efforts, there were still significant problems in relation to poverty and 
deprivation: “with some 840,000 individuals, or 17 per cent of Scotland's population, 
currently living in poverty, a figure that included 210,000 children, or 21 per cent of all 
Scottish children” (JRF, 2009, quoted in Scottish Government, 2009: 1). After 
repeating the now ubiquitous statement about the importance of learning from 
previous approaches, he stressed the need to move forward on both fronts 
simultaneously (Scottish Government, 2009). The emergent strategy made a 
commitment to focusing on reforming the way in which mainstream resources are 
used to support vulnerable communities; ensure a stronger focus on community-led 
regeneration; and finally, realise the economic potential of all Scotland’s communities 
through focussed funding and other support mechanisms (Scottish Government, 
2011). It also signalled the Community Empowerment and Renewal Bill, currently 
progressing through Parliament, which seeks to make it easier for communities to 
take on public assets. The only problem with both the policy focus and future Act is 
that there are very limited public resources to support such ambitions. Further, the 
ever expanding policy reach of regeneration, which now stretches to embrace town 
centres, place-making, enterprise zones, digital inclusion, sustainability and business 
improvement districts, to name but six recently added elements, can only produce a 
dilution of strategic focus. Without access to a significant earmarked regeneration 
budget, all these initiatives require to fall back on the bending of mainstream budgets. 
The current People and Communities budget is tokenistic when compared to in scale 
to previously available regeneration funds.   
The other real problem with the emergent policy framework is that it does not appear 
to be working. Audit Scotland has undertaken a couple of major reviews of the 
workings of CPPs and both were highly critical of the relative absence of strategic 
capacity and tangible evidence of joint working arrangements (Audit Scotland, 2011; 
2013). It also revealed significant variations in approach with distinct strengths and 
more commonly weaknesses across the authorities studies. Perhaps the most 
worrying aspect, and one that ties back to a sustained criticism of regeneration 
practice, is that there is little or nothing said about employment, the root of many 
localised social problems (McGregor and McConnachie, 1998; McGregor et al., 1998; 
Rae 2012). Neither the current Edinburgh, nor Glasgow SOA have a direct tie up 
with the local labour market. While the Glasgow SOA has tackling youth 
unemployment as one of its three objectives, there is not a clear link with a detailed 
local economic development strategy, or associated labour market demands. The 
negative social and economic problems associated with burgeoning youth 
unemployment are well made, but how the SOA can best address these is not clearly 
articulated. The 2014 Commonwealth Games can only ever provide a limited labour 
market spin off. Further, while the interconnections and implications of health matters 
are well made, as is the need to foster early interventions, especially in relation to the 
wider social and economic costs of alcohol abuse, again detailed in the Glasgow 
SOA, the actual connection with Health Board planning and SOA, and planning and 
actual programme delivery still appears distant and somewhat detached (ODS, 
2013). The problems and consequences of these problems are well understood, but 
the CPPs agreed vision to address them appears thin and not well worked through, 
more of a wish list than a planned set of agreed and budgeted action. 
This is hardly a new issue, as this review details. In the past SE passed down its 
statutory duty to participate in Community Planning to the LECs, and never defined 
what that contribution should be. Now, with the recent demise of the LECs, in both 
SE and HIE, and the re-emergence of a distinct and separate training body, Skills 
Scotland (SS), this statutory requirement remains a challenge to pin down given 
none of these entities now has a local geographic mode of operation. Not 
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surprisingly, SOA say little about local economic development, while SE, HIE and SS 
offer strategies and outcomes for their respective economic ambitions that do not 
easily tie across to the 32 geographically specific SOAs.  
The deep public expenditure cuts, brought in by the UK Coalition Government’s 
austerity programme from 2010, which will also impact on the Barnett Formula 
consequentials, will bring about a dramatic decline in the Scottish Government’s 
budget. While concerns as to the impacts of these cuts has produced a lot more 
talking between CPPs, joint budgeting and working still appears to be a long way off 
(personal interview), as recently illustrated by the problems with health and social 
care joint working pilots in Lanarkshire (Scottish Government, 2012b). When public 
expenditure was more abundant, partners talked about the need and value of joint 
working, but largely still did their own thing. Now, as the combined resource base 
available to CPPs drops away, the need to work together becomes all the more 
obvious. Yet still, despite such encouragement, little is happening on the ground 
(Audit Commission, 2011; 2013). The recently published Christie Commission makes 
a passionately case for all parties involved in local service delivery to find the means 
to deliver on both partnership and joint working (Christie Commission, 2011). Yet, 
some fifteen years on from the advent of community planning per se, and thirty years 
on from ‘New Life’, the organisational, budgeting and delivery challenges presented 
by partnership working are still to be fully addressed.  
Work still continues in this area, with perhaps most emphasis being in trying to better 
integrate adult health and social care, via the utilisation of the Change Fund (Scottish 
Government, 2013d). These are small, defined budgets under different priority areas, 
such as children, elderly and such like, which CPP’s bid for to enhance and improve 
preventative joint-working across public services. As highlighted throughout this 
chapter, this has been the general direction of travel for public policy, as 
conceptualised by the Scottish Government. However, ambition for now over a 
decade has been stymied by the pre-existing organisational structures and their 
associated working practices within the public services (Christie Commission, 2011). 
Further, given the prime focus here is thus organisational, it is thus largely non-
spatial. 
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3 3. Summary 
Looking back over 80 years regeneration in Scotland exudes a distinctive 
‘Groundhog Day’ quality, given the many communities subjected to almost cyclical 
renewal practices ever since the original slum clearance programme brought them 
into existence back in the 1930s. It is also evident that Glasgow, in particular, has 
long dominated the various programmes and initiatives over these years, but despite 
this focus, still finds itself consistently at the bottom of socio-economic indicators for 
Scotland, the UK and Europe.  
Deprived places, identified in the latest by SIMD, for 2012, are similar to those 
identified in previous Index editions (2009, 2006, 2004). Of the 976 datazones3 found 
in the 15 per cent most deprived in SIMD 2012, about three quarters (77 per cent) 
were also in the 15 per cent most deprived in all the previous editions. Of these 
appearing in SIMD 2012, only five per cent had never appeared in this category 
before (SIMD, 2013). 
The most deprived 2012 datazone was Ferguslie Park, Paisley. It had been the most 
deprived in 2006, and was ranked 2nd in 2009. The other datazones in the top five 
order by most deprived datazones are: 
 Possil Park, Glasgow City 
 Keppochhill, Glasgow (adjacent to Possil Park) 
 Ferguslie, Paisley, Renfrewshire, (another within Ferguslie Park) 
 Parkhead West and Barrowfield (in Glasgow’s East End). 
All were originally clearance estates, seeing new council housing built in the 1930s to 
solve the slum conditions and associated health problems, and each has since been 
subject to a variety of renewal initiatives since the 1970s. Ferguslie was Scotland’s 
only CDP project in 1968 and, subsequently, one of the four New Life partnerships in 
1988. Both Parkhead and Barrowfield were part of the GEAR project, while Keppoch 
and Possil underwent extensive council and housing association investments, dating 
back to the Heath’s Conservative government of the 1970s. All five have undergone 
substantial subsequent clearance and partial rebuilding programmes during the 
1990s and 2000s. 
Glasgow, long the core focus of so much of Scotland’s renewal efforts, still finds itself 
with 42 per cent of its 694 datazones being in the 15 per cent most deprived 
datazones in 2012. This compares to 44 per cent in 2009, 48 per cent in 2006 and 
52 per cent in 2004. 
                                               
3
 Datazones are the lowest Census geography in Scotland, with a population of between 500 and 1,000 people. 
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In total, 742,200 people live in Scotland’s 15 per cent most deprived areas. However, 
it is important to remember that the SIMD identifies deprived places not people, 
given not everyone living in a deprived area is deprived, and not all deprived people 
live in deprived places. Of the nearly three-quarters of a million people living in these 
deprived areas, just under a third (31 per cent), amounting to a quarter of a million 
people, were defined as income deprived (SIMD, 2013). Drawing from the 2011 
Census, the employment rate in the 15 per cent most deprived areas in Scotland 
was 58 per cent, compared to a rate of 73 per cent for the rest of Scotland. The 
unemployment rate in the most deprived decile, the top ten per cent most deprived 
datazones, was more than three times that in the least deprived decile (17 per cent 
compared to five per cent). Strikingly one of the most glaring reasons for this 
economic inactivity was long-term sickness, not something regeneration policy has 
focused upon. In the first quintile, the 20 per cent most deprived datazones, sickness 
accounts for nearly half of the economic inactivity, compared to just ten per cent in 
the fifth, or least deprived quintile.  
As a measure the SIMD is not sensitive to an ‘absolute’ improvement in relation to 
deprivation. For example, up to 2008 worklessness overall dropped by some 20 per 
cent, reflecting the improved national economic position. However, during the 
recession these gains have markedly fallen away. What is striking is that the ‘relative 
relative positioning of deprived neighbourhoods has not really altered over time. 
These are two distinct issues, in that there can be an ‘absolute’ internal experience 
of change, but it fails to alter the ‘relative’ positioning of places in respect of 
deprivation. 
Taken together, the geographic locus of poverty and deprivation does not appear to 
have migrated that much in 80 years, despite all that regeneration activity. That said, 
70 per cent of income-deprived households reside outwith these apparently fixed 
poor neighbourhoods. Much has been said about the dynamics of poverty, at a 
neighbourhood level, but the household turnover, or churn, within such localities is 
not dramatically different from slightly better off neighbourhoods (Bailey et al, 2012).  
Traditionally, central government ‘top sliced’ local government budgets to provide 
both elements of its regeneration programme: physical improvements which long 
targeted slum conditions, as well as Urban Aid which focused more on people in 
deprived council estates. Both interventions were area-based interventions. Although 
the political context changed, it was a decade into the Thatcher administration before 
the actual operation of regeneration policy altered, with its focus moving more 
towards council estates and the programme delivery became overtly centrally 
controlled, via distinct agencies and budgets. While the policy rhetoric espoused the 
need to embrace enterprise and business, the delivery was still very much state 
funded and controlled. Then with devolution another change in political context 
occurred, which saw central government progressively withdraw over time, leaving it 
to local government and its partners to set down its broad strategic goals to deliver 
social justice, rather than regeneration. It would be wrong to suggest power was 
further devolved, rather it was a partnership whereby government insisted that local 
government joined them in ensuring that their nationally agreed policy outcomes 
were locally delivered.  
By focusing on regeneration it is possible to trace out the slow but steady trajectory 
towards this outcomes-based agenda, which long embraced the managerialist 
ambitions of both central and local government administrators, who saw much merit 
in pursuing partnership working. Trying to take forward regeneration programmes, of 
different sorts and over differing timeframes and policy contexts, encouraged them to 
adopt a broader, more holistic understanding of what constituted regeneration, an 
ambition dating right back to the 1970s. One outcome of this change is a new power 
relationship between the two levels of government, and effectively the demise of 
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agency working. This also brought with it the accompanying loss of distinct and 
separate budgets that such agencies previously drew upon to meet their goals. Not 
surprisingly, given the history outlined in this paper, the core task of economic 
planning and development was not part of this reform agenda, and neither was 
health service planning. Under partnership working there has been a sustained effort 
at a national policy level to ensure better co-ordination of existing budgets, and 
encouragement to bend mainstream budgets to tackle perceived and agreed 
problem areas, but these are now people or issue focussed, rather than being spatial. 
This shift has, as a consequence, brought with it the almost complete demise of an 
area-based focus on regeneration, and this represents a major finding of this review, 
given it is in stark contrast with both Wales and Northern Ireland. Further, what little 
now constitutes as traditional regeneration activity is also now broader, embracing a 
wide variety of ‘community projects’, as the recent Regeneration Capital Fund ably 
illustrates.   
The withdrawal of area-based regeneration funding from poor neighbourhoods could 
be taken as an acknowledgement that such places house only a minority of poor 
people, and are not the cause of their own poverty, but rather illustrative of how other 
broader socio-economic forces help foster such neighbourhood deterioration (van 
Ham and Manley, 2010; Hastings, 2004; Mathews, 2010; 2012). But does this not 
also imply that the poorer neighbourhoods are now expected to solve their own 
problems in situ, without the additional help of the past? While such area-based 
programmes had problems in relation to the targeting of resources to needs, they did 
express a commitment to address a spatially manifestation of extreme poverty, and 
thus a sustained political interest in the issue.  
Perhaps more germane to this change of emphasis is a powerful managerial 
argument, namely that the actual scale of available regeneration cash, in whatever 
form, was always small, when compared to the scale of combined mainstream 
budgets. Currently, Scotland’s public service spending, which is subject to major cuts, 
amounts to £35bn for 2014/14 (Scottish Government, 2013). This means that local 
authority spending will fall from £7.2bn in this current financial year to £6.5bn in the 
next. It is worth noting, at its peak in the early 1990s, total earmarked regeneration 
monies amounted to £400m. 
But there is a major problem here, and it is simply that the evidence amassed for this 
review can find no tangible evidence that bending mainstream budgets to address 
poverty and deprivation is actually taking place. In fact, the evidence indicates that 
SOAs, and before them CPs, are a weak and ineffective strategic planning tool given 
the lack of a direct tie back to budgeting and funding (Audit Scotland, 2011; 2013; 
Christie Commission, 2012; Midwinter, 2009). There are two issues here, firstly, the 
lack of dedicated budgets to address SOA ambitions and, secondly, the limited 
scope CPPs have in influencing the decisions about mainstream agencies budgets. 
While there are Change Funds to help facilitate agreed joint working, focussed on 
Scottish Government specified target groups, again people rather than place focused, 
given the scale of recent expenditure cuts these are likely to shore up existing 
services than illustrate a ‘decisive shift to prevention’. In such a tight fiscal 
environment organisations will act to protect their own budgets, rather than pool 
them. That said, the almost glacial lack of progress in respect of community or 
participatory budgeting also suggests there is no real public service buy into adopting 
this mode of working, despite encouragement from the Christie Commission. 
Further, there is still no clear tie up with the physical or economic planning system, 
nor a robust system of monitoring and evaluation operated by either local or central 
government, nor its partners (personal interviews). The connections with health 
service spending are also quite opaque, despite ill health being so core to poverty. 
Then add to this contemporary research on service delivery within poor 
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neighbourhoods, in the case of cleaning and environmental services (Hastings, 
2005), and historic evidence from the SRCs pioneering ‘Social Strategy for the 
Eighties’ (SRC, 1983; Young, 1999) initiative, and it is evident that bending 
mainstream budgets, to target additional resources to either poorer neighbourhoods, 
or particular disadvantaged groups, always constitutes a step too far for local 
government bureaucracy. The addition of other planning partners, into this mix, has 
not altered that reality, given the strong parallels in professional training, imbedded 
understandings of public service delivery, distinct organisational structures and 
commitment to preserving dedicated budgets. This is, of course, hardly a new 
problem. After all, was it not in response to such perceived failings, on the part of 
local government, that central government was encouraged to engage in 
regeneration in the late 1960s, through establishing distinct budgets, dedicated 
agencies and area-based strategies? It may be that we are witnessing a broader 
public policy cycle where specific place based interventions are set aside in favour of 
better universal delivery models. 
In this context the review has also revealed a strongly held commitment to positivism, 
delivered through rational evidence driven policy-making, informing broad master 
planning – initially CPs and now SOA. Hence, the long held commitment, no matter 
the political administration, to refining organisational structures and the incessant 
refinement of management processes, over the last 25 years of partnership working. 
With its antecedence in refining management practices associated with fostering 
regeneration partnership working, a new basis of local authority strategic planning 
has emerged over the last decade. Yet, as the evidence reveals, despite such 
commitment and a concerted policy effort to this mode of working, major problems 
persist with partnership working, especially in terms of shared strategic thinking and 
critically with progressing joint budgeting (Christie Commission, 2011; Audit Scotland, 
2013). 
This antecedence helps explain another related finding, namely that success tends 
to be couched primarily in terms of organisational and managerial innovation, and 
the detailing of what constituted ‘good practice’ rather than in the actual impact such 
initiatives have had in addressing poverty and deprivation. This was perhaps most 
evident within the SIPs reviews. Being able to say whether the project under review 
was actually addressing the core ambitions of improving the lives of poor people has 
rarely, if ever been answered. Scottish experience here is at variance with practice in 
England, but mirrors that of Wales and Northern Ireland. Each commissioned 
evaluation, for the last 30 years, has consistently recommended improved baseline 
and operational data collection, as being the only means to enhance the robustness 
of such evaluations. Given the ubiquity of this recommendation what is hard to 
explain is why this has yet to be properly acted upon. In the case of SIPs, the 
assembly of standardised small grain area and operational data, to allow for the 
ongoing evaluative of the impact of these interventions, had been made a funding 
requirement. Just why were these continuous pleas and, in later cases, direct 
instructions to ensure a proper evaluative framework was put in place, consistently 
ignored? Was it that assembling such data proved just to challenging? Were the 
funders unwilling, or unable to enforce these funding requirements? What this means 
is that after four decades, it is actually impossible to say what the impact of this work 
actually had, if any (Fyfe, 2009; McGregor, 2009). Generally, in the past it was easy 
to list the top line budget headings, and the number of houses built or improved, 
although in recent years even this task has become harder. It has also never been 
possible to detail the actual outcomes of such investment, despite the entire drift of 
public policy being to insist upon this happening. 
In other countries, most notably in the Netherlands and Denmark, the approach 
adopted to facilitate joint working and enhance an outcomes focused approach has 
differed, in that they attach a single neighbourhood budget, and then ask the differing 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 25 
community and engaged professional interests to work together to set local priorities 
and then actively monitor these. Such a real devolution of power and money has 
never been attempted in Scotland, in large part, because the various parties involved 
in regeneration practice have long been unwilling to succeed power, and especially 
to local people. This is hardly anything new, as a re-reading the Skeffington Report 
(1968) poignantly illustrates. The problem revealed by this review is that without a 
distinct place dimension, mainstream budgeting proves discriminatory while, at the 
same time, area-based initiatives have consistently not been able to show marked 
changes in the social, as opposed to physical conditions within these localities. 
Finally, it is ironic, that the rhetoric of regeneration has long proffered an extensive 
lexicon extolling the importance of involving local people: community consultation, 
involvement, engagement, participation and empowerment. Glasgow’s community-
based housing associations offered one long-established and successful mode of 
such working, but although regularly name checked when promoting other initiatives, 
most notably the Glasgow housing stock transfer, this approach was not acted upon, 
nor utilised by those exercising the power within the field of regeneration. Rather the 
language of community found itself hijacked, so much so that the entire strategic 
planning system is now the responsibility of Community Plan Partners, bodies that 
have been continually criticised for failing to engage with, let alone embrace local 
communities in their work (ODS, 2006; Fyfe, 2009; Audit Scotland, 2013). Those with 
power capture the discourse, and Scottish regeneration bears witness to that reality. 
 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 26 
 4 4. References 
Anderson, M and Fairley, J (1983) The politics of industrial training in the UK. Journal of 
Public Policy, 3 (2). 
Audit Scotland (2013) Improving Community Planning. Edinburgh: Audit Scotland. 
http://www.audit-scotland.gov.uk/docs/central/2013/nr_130320_improving_cpp.pdf 
Audit Scotland (2011) The Role of Community Planning Partnerships in Economic Planning. 
Edinburgh: Audit Scotland. http://www.audit-
scotland.gov.uk/docs/central/2011/nr_111103_community_planning_km_bw.pdf 
Bailey, N Kearns, A and Livingston, M (2012) Place attachment in deprived neighbourhoods: 
The impact of population turnover and social mix. Housing Studies, 27 (2), pp. 208-231. 
Bailey, N and Livingston, M (2008) Selective migration and area deprivation: evidence from 
2001 Census migration data for England and Scotland. Urban Studies, 45 (4), pp. 943-61. 
Bailey, N and Livingston, M (2007) Population Turnover and Area Deprivation. Bristol: Policy 
Press. 
Bailey, N and Robertson, D (1997) Housing renewal, urban policy and gentrification. Urban 
Studies, 34 (4), pp. 561-578. 
Bell, D and Eiser, D (2013) Inequality in Scotland: Trends, drivers and the implications for 
independence debate. London: ESRC. 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/_images/Inequality%20paper%2013%20Nov%20Final_tcm8-
29182.pdf 
Bond, L Kearns, A Tannahill C Egan, M and Mason, P (2013) Housing Outcomes Over Time: 
Comparision across the 2006, 2008 and 2011 GoWell community surveys. Glasgow: Go 
Well.  http://www.gowellonline.com/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc 
_details&gid=255&Itemid=67 
Boyle, R (1993) Changing partners: The experience of urban economic policy in West 
Central Scotland, 1980-90. Urban Studies, 30, pp. 309 -324. 
Brown, A and Fairley, J (1987) A Scottish labour market board?, In: D McCrone (ed) The 
Scottish Government Yearbook 1987. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 219-238.  
Christie Commission (2011) Report on the Future Delivery of Public Services. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Government. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2011/06/27154527/0 
Cambridge Economic Consultants (2003) Developing a transition framework for social 
inclusion partnerships: Interim programme review. Edinburgh: Communities Scotland.  
Cambridge Economic Associates (2001) National Evaluation of the former Regeneration 
Programmes. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Central Research Unit. 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 27 
Cambridge Policy Consultants (1999) An Evaluation of the New Life for Urban Scotland 
Initiative in Castlemilk, Ferguslie Park, Wester Hailes and Whitfield. Edinburgh: Scottish 
Executive. 
Cameron, S and Davoudi, S (1998) Combatting social exclusion: Looking in or looking out?, 
In: A. Madaanipour, G. Cars, & J. Allen (eds) Social Exclusion in European Cities. London: 
Jessica Kingsley.  
Clapham, D and Kintrea, K (1986) Rationing, choice and constraint: The allocation of public 
housing in Glasgow. Journal of Social Policy, 15 (1), pp. 51-67.  
Clapham, D Kintrea, K and Whitefield, L (1991) Community Ownership in Glasgow: An 
evaluation. Edinburgh: Scottish Office.  
Clark, S (1988) Paisley: A history. Edinburgh: Mainstream.  
Damer, S (1974) ‘Wine Alley’: The sociology of a dreadful enclosure. Sociological Review, 
22 (2), pp. 221-248. 
Dean, J and Hastings, A (2000) Challenging Images: Housing estates, stima and 
regeneration. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Deakin, N and Edwards, J (1993) The Enterprise Culture and the Inner City. London: Taylor 
Francis. 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells, and Roger Tym & Partners (1982) GEAR Review: Business 
Development and Employment Strategy, Final Report for the Scottish Development Agency. 
Glasgow: Scottish Development Agency. 
Dewar, D (1998) Inaugural Lecture of Scottish Urban Regeneration Forum, 8 May 1998. 
Department of Employment (1988) Employment in the 1980s (Cm 540). London: HMSO. 
Department of Environment (1977) Policy for Inner Areas Studies (Cmnd. 6845). London: 
HMSO. 
Donnison, D and Middleton, A (1987) Regenerating the Inner City: Glasgow’s Experience. 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Duguid, G (1995) Deprived Areas in Scotland: Results of an analysis of the 1991 Census. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Office Central Research Unit. 
Fairley, J and Lloyd, G (1995) Economic development and training: The roles of Scottish 
Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise and the Local Enterprise Companies. Scottish 
Affairs, 12, pp. 52-72. 
Fairley, J (1989) An overview of the development and growth of the MSC in Scotland, In: A 
Brown and J Fairley (eds) The Manpower Services Commission. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Fyfe, A (2009) Tackling Multiple Deprivation in Communities: Considering the Evidence. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Government. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/ 
06/01092951/0 
Gibb, K Kearns, A Keoghan, M Mackay, D and Turok, I (1999) Revising the Scottish Area 
Deprivation Index, Vol.1. Edinburgh: Scottish Office Central Research Unit. 
Gulliver, S (1984) The area projects of the Scottish Development Agency. Town Planning 
Review, 55 (3), pp. 322-334. 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 28 
Harkins, C and Egan, J (2012) The Role of Participatory Budgeting in promoting Localism 
and Mobilising Community Assets: But where next for participatory budgeting in Scotland? 
Glasgow: Glasgow Centre for Population Health. 
http://www.gcph.co.uk/assets/0000/3145/GCPH_Participatory_Budgeting_FINAL.pdf 
Hastings, A (2006) Unravelling the process of ‘partnership’ in urban policy. Urban Studies, 
33 (2), pp. 253-268. 
Hastings, A (2004) Stigma and social housing estates: Beyond pathological explanations. 
Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 19 (3), pp. 233-254. 
Hastings, A (2000) Discourse analysis: What does it offer housing studies. Housing, Theory 
and Society, 17 (3), pp. 131-139. 
Haworth, R (2000) Patrick Geddes’ concept of conservative surgery. Architectural Heritage 
XI, pp. 37-42.  
Hayton, K (1999) RTPI Baseline Paper – Urban Regeneration. Edinburgh: RTPI.  
Hayton, K (1993) Progress in partnership: The future of regeneration in Scotland. Quarterly 
Economic Commentary, 19, pp. 51-56. 
HMSO (1988) Action for Cities. London: HMSO. 
HMSO (1967) Children’s and their Primary Schools (Plowden Report). London: HMSO. 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2009) Child Poverty in Scotland: Taking the next steps. York: 
JRF. http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/poverty-children-scotland-viewpoint.pdf 
Keating, M. and Boyle, R. (1986) Re-making Urban Scotland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Kintrea, K (1996) Whose partnership? Community interests in the regeneration of a Scottish 
housing scheme. Housing Studies, 11 (2), pp. 287-306. 
Livingston, M Bailey, N and Kearns, A (2008) People's Attachment to Place: The influence of 
neighbourhood deprivation. Coventry: CIH/JRF. 
Livingston, M Bailey, N and Kearns, A (2010) Neighbourhood attachment in deprived areas: 
Evidence from the north of England. Journal of Housing and the Built Environment, 25 (4), 
pp. 409-27. 
Lupton, R (2013) Neighbourhood Renewal in the UK 1997-2013. Working Draft. 
Mathews, P (2012a) From area-based initiatives to strategic partnerships: have we lost the 
meaning of regeneration? Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 30 (1), pp. 
147-161. 
Mathews, P (2012b) Problem definition and re-evaluating a policy: The real success of a 
regeneration scheme. Critical Policy Studies, 6 (3), pp. 221-240. 
Mathews, P (2012c) The return of place in Scottish social policy. Local Economy, 28 (1), pp. 
9-16. 
Mathews, P (2010) Mind the Gap? The persistence of pathological discourses in urban 
regeneration policy. Housing, Theory and Society, 27 (3), pp. 221-240.  
McCarthy, J (2007) Partnership, Collaborative Planning and Urban Regeneration. Aldershot: 
Ashgate.   
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 29 
McCarthy, J (1999) Urban regeneration in Scotland: An agenda for the Scottish Parliament. 
Regional Studies, 36, pp. 559-566. 
McCarthy, J (1997) Empowerment or exclusion? Town and Country Planning, 66 (1), pp. 20-
21. 
Macpherson, S (2006) Promoting ‘strategic’ working within area-based and thematic social 
inclusion partnerships in Scotland. Local Economy, 21 (2), pp. 180-196. 
Macpherson, S Goodlad, R. and McKenzie, C. (2007) Learning Lessons from Thematic 
Social Inclusion Partnerships. Edinburgh: Communities Scotland. 
McArthur, A (1987) Jobs and incomes, In: D Donnison & A Middleton (eds) Regenerating the 
Inner City: Glasgow’s Experience. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 72-92. 
McCrone, G (1991) Urban renewal: The Scottish experience. Urban Studies, 28 (6), pp. 919-
938. 
McGregor, A (2009) Tackling Multiple Deprivation in Communities Conference Overview. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Government.  
McGregor, A Fitzpatrick, I Glass, A and Richmond, K (1998) Regeneration Areas and 
Barriers to Employment. Glasgow: TERU, University of Glasgow. 
McGregor, A and McConnachie, M (1998) Social exclusion, urban regeneration and 
economic reintegration. Urban Studies, 32 (10), pp. 1587-1600. 
McKendrick, J Sinclair, S Mason, D and Smith, N, with Gillespie, M Bivand, P Moley, S and 
Tyler, T (2007) Closing the Opportunity Gap Programme: Phase 1 Evaluation. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Government. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/12/07105255/9 
Midwinter, A (2009) Single Outcome Agreement: A Critical View. Unpublished paper. 
Moore, C and Booth, S (1989) Managing Competition: Meso corporatism, pluralism and the 
negotiated order in Scotland. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Nelson, S (1980) Participating in GEAR: Strathclyde Area Survey. Glasgow: University of 
Glasgow & University of Strathclyde. 
North, D and Syrett, S (2008) Making the links: Economic deprivation, neighbourhood 
renewal and scales of government. Regional Studies, 42 (1), pp. 133-148. 
ODS Consulting (2013) Glasgow’s Single Outcome Agreement. Glasgow: Glasgow City 
Council. 
ODS Consulting (2006) An overview of the social inclusion partnership (SIP) programme. 
Research from Communities Scotland Report, 47. Edinburgh: Communities Scotland. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/1125/0086285.pdf 
Paisley Community Development Project (1968a) A Profile of Ferguslie Park. Paisley: 
Paisley CDP. 
Paisley Community Development Project (1968b) Housing Allocation and Social Segregation. 
Paisley: Paisley CDP. 
Pawson, H Munro, M Carle, M Lancaster, S Kintrea, K and Littlewood, A (1998) Smaller 
Urban Renewal Initiatives (SURI’s): An Interim Evaluation. Report to Scottish Homes. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Homes. 
Pearce, J (1993) At the Heart of the Community: Economy and community enterprise in a 
changing world. London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 30 
Raco, M (2009) From expectations to aspirations: State modernisation, urban policy, and the 
existential politics of welfare in the UK. Political Geography, 28, pp. 436 - 454. 
Rae, A (2012) Spatial patterns of labour market deprivation in Scotland: Concentration, 
isolation and persistence. Local Economy, 27 (5/6), pp. 593-609. 
Rae, A (2011) Learning from the past? A review of approaches to spatial targeting in urban 
policy. Planning Theory & Practice, 12 (3), pp. 331-348. 
Roberts, P (2004) Urban regeneration in Scotland: Context, contributions and choices for the 
future, In: D Newlands, M Danson & J McCartny (eds) Divided Scotland? The nature, causes 
and consequences of economic disparities within Scotland. Aldershot: Ashgate. 137-155. 
Robertson, D (2013) Knowing your place: The formation and substance of class-based place 
identity. Housing, Theory and Society. 
Robertson, D (2012) Glasgow’s community-based housing associations: More accident than 
design. Paper presented at the 11th International Conference on Urban History, Charles 
University, Prague, Czech Republic, September. 
Robertson, D (2001) Community Planning: Right sentiments, wrong approach. Scottish 
Affairs, 34, pp. 68-90.  http://scottishaffairs.org/backiss/pdfs/sa34/SA34_Robertson.pdf 
Robertson, D (1992) Scottish home improvements policy, 1945-75: Coming to terms with the 
tenement. Urban Studies, 29 (7), pp. 1115-1136. 
Robertson, D (1998) Pulling in opposite directions: The failure of post-war planning to 
regenerate Glasgow. Planning Perspectives, 13 (1), pp. 53-67. 
Robertson, D and Bailey, N (1996) Review of the impact of Housing Action Areas. Research 
Report, 47. Edinburgh: Scottish Homes. 
Rogers, S Smith, M Sullivan, H and Clarke, M (2000) Community planning in Scotland: An 
evaluation of the Pathfinder Projects commissioned by CoSLA. Edinburgh: CoSLA. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/158150/0042793.pdf 
Scottish Development Agency (1978) GEAR Household Survey. Glasgow: SDA. 
Scottish Executive (2006a) People and place: Regeneration policy statement. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/94244/0022669.pdf 
Scottish Executive (2006b) Social Justice: A Scotland where everyone matters? Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/1999/11/4174/File-1 
Scottish Executive (2003) Building Better Cities: Delivering growth and opportunities. 
Executive Policy Statement. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2003/01/16094/16234 
Scottish Executive (2002a) Better Communities in Scotland: Closing the gap. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/46729/0031676.pdf 
Scottish Executive (2002b) Social Inclusion – Opening the Door to a Better Scotland. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Executive. 
Scottish Executive (1999a) The Monitoring Framework for Social Inclusion Partnerships. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Executive. 
Scottish Executive (1999b) Social Justice: A Scotland where everyone matters. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Executive. 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 31 
Scottish Government (2013a) Community Empowerment and Renewal Bill. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Government. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Performance/programme-for-
government/2013-14/Community-Empowerment-Renewal-Bill 
Scottish Government (2013b) Regeneration Capital Grant Fund: Projects recommended for 
funding. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Built-
Environment/regeneration/investment/capitalgrants/rcgf/recommended 
Scottish Government (2013c) Scottish Budget: Draft Budget 2015/16. Edinburgh: Scottish 
Government. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/0043/00433802.pdf 
Scottish Government (2013d) Joint Strategic Commissioning Plans and the Change Fund 
Guidance for Local partnerships 2013/14. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/924/0111884.pdf 
Scottish Government (2012a) Guidance for new SOA. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Government/local-government/CP/SOA2012/SOA2012 
Scottish Government (2012b) Integration of Adult Health and Social care in Scotland: 
Consultation on proposals. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/05/6469/16 
Scottish Government (2011) Achieving a Sustainable Future: Regeneration Strategy. 
Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/364595/0123891.pdf 
Scottish Government (2009) Tackling Multiple Deprivation in Communities: Report of 
Evidence Event - June 2, 2009. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Built-Environment/regeneration/fairer-scotland-
fund/EvidenceEvent#a1 
Scottish Government (2008) Equally Well: Report of the Ministerial Task Force on Health 
Inequalities. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2008/06/25104032/0 
Scottish Government (2007) Concordat between the Scottish Government and Local 
Government. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/923/0054147.pdf 
Scottish Government (2007) National Performance Framework. Edinburgh: Scottish 
Government. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/11/13092240/9 
Scottish Government and COSLA (2007) Concordat between the Scottish Government and 
COSLA. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/ 
Doc/923/0054147.pdf 
SIMD (2013) Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation Results 2012. Edinburgh: Scottish 
Government. http://simd.scotland.gov.uk/publication-2012/simd-2012-results/ 
Scottish Office (1999) Social Inclusion: Opening the door to a better Scotland. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Office. 
Scottish Office (1998) Social Exclusion in Scotland: A consultation paper. Edinburgh: 
Scottish Office. 
Scottish Office (1995) Programme for Partnership: Announcement of the Scottish Office 
review of urban regeneration policy. Edinburgh: Scottish Office. 
Scottish Office (1993) Progress in Partnership: A Consultation Paper on the Future of Urban 
Regeneration Policy in Scotland. Edinburgh: Scottish Office. 
 Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research | 32 
Scottish Office (1988a) New Life for Urban Scotland. Edinburgh: Scottish Office. 
Scottish Office (1988b) Scottish Enterprise: A new approach to training and enterprise 
creation. Edinburgh: Scottish Office.  
Sheil, L and Smith-Milne, D (2007) Best Practice in Establishing Urban Regeneration 
Companies in Scotland. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2007/09/20103240/0 
Sheil, L and Clark, I (2004) Developing Local Outcome Agreements for the Better 
Neighbourhood Services Fund. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2004/04/19302/36407 
Skeffington Report (1969) People and Planning: Report of the Skeffington Committee on 
Public Participation in Planning. London: HMSO. 
Strathclyde Regional Council (1982) Social Strategy for the Eighties. Glasgow: SRC. 
Strathclyde Regional Council (1976) Strathclyde Regional Council: Regional Report. 
Glasgow: SRC. 
Taylor, P (2002) Urban Regeneration Policy in Scotland: An overview of developments. 
Unpublished paper. http://homepage.ntlworld.com/peter.d.taylor/urintro.htm 
Taylor, P (1988) The Urban Programme in Scotland. Local Economy, 3 (3), pp. 205-218. 
Taylor, P Turok, I and Hastings, A (1999) An examination of unsuccessful Priority 
Partnership Area bids, Development Department Research Programme Research Findings, 
No. 67. Edinburgh: Scottish Executive Central Research Unit. 
Tribal (2004-06) Various SIPs Evaluations. Edinburgh: Tribal. 
Turok, I and Hopkins, N (1997) Picking winners or passing the buck? Competition and area 
selection in Scotland's new urban policy. Occasional Paper. Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 
Department of Urban Studies. 
van Ham, M. and Manley, D. (2010) The effect of neighbouhood housing mix on labour 
market outcomes: A longitudinal investigation of neighbourhood effects. Journal of Economic 
Geography, 10 (2), pp. 257-282. 
Wannop, U and Leclerc, R (1987) The management of GEAR, In: D Donnison & A Middleton 
(eds) Regenerating the Inner City: Glasgow’s Experience. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, pp. 218-231. 
Webster, D (2000) Scottish social inclusion policy: A critical assessment. Scottish Affairs, 30, 
pp. 28-50. 
Wedge, P and Prosser, H (1973) Born To Fail? London: National Children’s Bureau. 
Young, R (1999) From Multiple Deprivation to Social Exclusion: A case study in 
organisational learning and political amnesia. Unpublished paper. 
http://www.freewebs.com/publicadminreform/key%20papers/Lessons%20from%20SRC%20
experience.pdf 
